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Examining Political Change and
Presidential Power in the US
JOHN DUMBRELL
H. W. Brands, The Strange Death of American Liberalism (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, paperback edition, 2003, £9.95). Pp. 200. ISBN
0 300 098 24 3.
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process : A Constitutional and
Historical Analysis (Durham NC and London: Duke University Press, revised
and expanded paperback edition, 2003, £18.50). Pp. 406. ISBN 0 8223 3199 3.
William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion : The Politics of Direct Presidential Action
(Princeton NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003, cloth £29.95,
paper £12.95). Pp. 239. ISBN 0 691 10269, 0 691 10270 8.
Drew Noble Lanier, Of Time and Judicial Behavior : United States Supreme Court
Agenda – Setting and Decision-Making, 1888–1997 (Selinsgrove PA: Susquehanna
University Press and London: Associated University Presses, 2003, $42.50).
Pp. 276. ISBN 1 57591 067 5.
Byron E. Shafer, The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics
(Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 2003, cloth $35, paper $19.95). Pp. 356.
ISBN 0 7006 1235 1, 0 7006 1236 X.
One does not have to be an especially sophisticated philosopher of explanatory
method to appreciate that, in explaining change in human aﬀairs, much depends on
the situation of and level of analysis adopted by the would-be explainer. Do the dots
connect or are they mostly what they appear to be – just dots? Reality, according to
Bertrand Russell’s famous aphorism, is either a bowl of connected jelly or a bucket
of disconnected shot. It all depends on the observer, who, of course, is also part of
the reality being considered.
All the books under review attempt to produce some species of connective jelly to
describe – even to explain – political change in the United States. Questions of
perspective are explicitly raised in Byron Shafer’s ﬁne essay collection, The Two
Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics. Shafer, currently housed at the
University of Wisconsin, describes the collection as the product of his time as
Andrew W. Mellon Professor of American Government at Oxford University.
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According to Shafer, his transatlantic sojourn enabled him to discern ‘‘patterned
relationships ’’ between American political phenomena more clearly : ‘‘ some things
just look diﬀerent from a distance ’’ (2). He also acknowledges the inﬂuence of
Oxford political history. Shafer’s search is for sociological and comparative
approaches to understanding political change, thereby gaining entry to what he
describes as ‘‘ the hallowed land of ‘middle-level theory. ’ ’’
The book’s argument is complex, but may be summarized as follows : the New
Deal era persisted until 1968, and was characterized by a national preoccupation
with social welfare issues. The social basis for the politics of the period was provided
by blue-collar unionism on the Democratic side, and small business on the
Republican. By the 1950s, despite President Eisenhower’s willingness to continue as
a custodian of the New Deal, the system was under severe strain. By 1956, a white-
collar, middle-class majority had emerged. Giant corporations were also gaining
ground over small business, though Shafer considers ‘‘corporate gigantism’’ – and
its political expression, the ‘‘Modern, ’’ Liberal Republicanism of Senator Hugh
Scott (and, indeed, of Senator Prescott Bush) – to have peaked by 1959. By the
1960s, liberal Republicans were losing ground, while the Democratic Party was
dominated by graduate activists, concerned with cultural, national and ‘‘post-in-
dustrial ’’ (not Shafer’s term) issues. By 1968, the ‘‘era of divided government ’’ had
emerged, though the New Deal era party forms endured. The new period saw major
intra-party tensions, as issue activists clashed with rank and ﬁlers. ‘‘At bottom, ’’
writes Shafer (59), ‘‘ there were now two opposing majorities simultaneously present
in the mass public : more liberal than the active Republican Party on economics and
social welfare, more conservative than the active Democratic Party on culture and
foreign aﬀairs. ’’ One majority ‘‘ colonized ’’ Congress, the other the White House.
Neither Bill Clinton and the ‘‘New Democrats ’’ nor Newt Gingrich and the
‘‘Republican revolutionaries ’’ of the mid-1990s could solve the problem of cross-
cutting majorities. George W. Bush’s rhetorical 2000 ‘‘compassionate conservatism’’
is seen by Shafer as yet another eﬀort to solve the puzzle of the two majorities, as
changing social conditions again struggled to express themselves in the ‘‘old ’’ New
Deal party clothes.
The later essays in Shafer’s collection provide extensive, and comparative com-
mentary on the author’s underlying ‘‘ social basis ’’ analysis. One essay is developed
as a gloss on Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of elite circulation. (Shafer discusses organized
labour, ‘‘Modern Republicans, ’’ the ‘‘new politics ’’ Democrats (prosperous ‘‘baby
boomers ’’), and evangelical Protestants.) The book concludes by considering par-
allel social/political shifts in the UK and in the G-7 countries.
Byron’s Shafer’s prose is lucid – a model of clear political scientiﬁc ex-
position – and his insights many. Weaknesses includes a failure to treat, as an issue
of explanatory importance, the rise of the ‘‘party of non-voters, ’’ as well as a tend-
ency to lay too much expository weight on the rather ﬂimsy shoulders of ‘‘Modern
Republicanism’’.
H. W. Brands’ The Strange Death of American Liberalism inhabits a very diﬀerent
explanatory world. The politics of foreign policy, not the engines of social change,
occupy centre stage. Brands sees American liberalism as ‘‘ indubitably dead ’’ and sets
about a hunt for the killer. The culprit – Brands’ connective, explanatory jelly – is
identiﬁed as the ending of the Cold War, or at least the end of the Cold War
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consensus associated with the crisis years of the Vietnam conﬂict. (Brands tends
to view the Nixon–Kissinger detente as eﬀectively terminating the Cold War.
According to Brands, Americans never really accepted the return to Cold War after
1979.)
Brands’ argument is provocative and absorbing, even if more than a little over-
stated. Much hinges, of course, on how ‘‘ liberalism’’ is deﬁned. Brands has little
time for political philosophy. He deﬁnes ‘‘ liberalism’’ in terms of public faith in the
Federal Government and especially in the Presidency : ‘‘whatever else it entails,
liberalism is premised on a prevailing conﬁdence in the ability of govern-
ment – preeminently the Federal Government – to accomplish substantial good on
behalf of the American people ’’ (viii). National mobilization for the Cold War
caused Americans to abandon their traditional scepticism about the eﬃcacy and
desirability of strong governmental activism. Domestic reform and devel-
opment – the clearest example is President Eisenhower’s Federal highway pro-
gramme – were drawn into the ‘‘national security ’’ orbit. (Brands agrees with Shafer
that Ike was an entrencher of the New Deal. After 1995, Bill Clinton is seen by
Brands as transforming into the Democratic version of Eisenhower.) During the
Cold War, progressive domestic reform served the need to present American society
as an attractive alternative to communism. There was also a spillover eﬀect for
public attitudes : ‘‘ if government could be trusted on apocalyptic issues like war and
peace in the nuclear age, it ought to be able to handle lunches for school kids and
health care for old folks ’’ (125). By the 1980s, however, the game was up. Reagan’s
position – ‘‘distrust of government at home, faith in government abroad ’’ – was
contradictory, and exposed the excruciating agony of liberalism at near-death. The
fall of the Berlin Wall put the ailing patient out of its misery. One of the book’s
strongest sections involves a discussion of the immediate post-Cold War era, with
hopes for a liberal ‘‘peace dividend ’’ expiring amid Federal deﬁcits and the rise and
rise of anti-governmentalism.
While engaging in its directness, Brands’ argument does lead him towards an
unsustainable monocausalism, as well as rather cavalier treatment of phenomena
which do not readily ﬁt the Cold War template. His historical scheme causes him to
downplay the signiﬁcance of the Progressive era – Progressives, we are told, had no
conception of positive government – and indeed of the New Deal. For Brands, the
surprising feature of the 1930s was precisely how limited and restrained was the
Federal response to the Great Depression. (It is interesting that Aaron Friedberg,
contra Brands and Michael Sherry, has made exactly the same argument about the
federal government in the era of the Cold War.1) At times, Brands is forced to
concede that he may be bending the explanatory stick a little too far : ‘‘By no stretch
of the imagination was the Cold War the single, or even the primary, cause of the
civil rights movement or the War on Poverty ’’ (68). Some of his generalizations are
questionable. Contrary to Brands’ opinion, President Johnson was consciously
pursuing detente before 1968. Did the Carter Presidency really accomplish ‘‘ little
1 Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State ; America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War
Grand Strategy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) ; Michael S. Sherry, In the
Shadow of War : the United States since the 1930s (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1995).
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beyond allowing conservatives time to regroup ’’ (127)? Brands also blithely ignores
the mass of empirical political science literature on public attitudes towards
government. He does make the persuasive point, on the book’s ﬁnal page, that the
‘‘ conservatism’’ of Americans (deﬁned in terms of scepticism towards government)
is ‘‘pragmatic rather than ideological ’’ ; the problem, however, is that this conclusion
tends to undermine much of the preceding argument. Brands conspicuously fails to
discuss a key issue raised in the Shafer essays : the rift, in both parties, between
ideological activists and pragmatic rank and ﬁle. A less important, though (so to
speak) strange, omission involves the failure of Brands’ Strange Death to cite the work
of George Dangerﬁeld, who presumably gave the book its title.2
The original, hardback edition of The Strange Death of American Liberalism was
published in 2001, before the 11 September terror attacks. Brands does, however,
raise the possibility of a major, new threat to US security causing a revival of the
liberal faith. His rather jejune deﬁnitions of ‘‘ liberalism’’ and ‘‘conservatism’’ pre-
vent him from allowing the possibility of a ‘‘conservative authoritarian ’’ response to
threat. Brands’ book, it must nonetheless be emphasized, is hugely enjoyable and
stimulating.
William Howell’s Power without Persuasion is less concerned to explain political
change than to eﬀect a change in how we perceive Presidential power : away from
Richard Neustadt’s ‘‘bargaining ’’ model3 and towards a paradigm focussed more on
unilateral authority. Howell actually begins his book with a reference to President
George W. Bush’s post-9/11 ‘‘ﬂurry of unilateral directives to combat terrorism. ’’
Besides dethroning the Neustadt ‘‘bargaining ’’ model – Howell argues that con-
sensus views on the Presidency tend to overestimate the importance of personal
skills and qualities – Power without Persuasion has two other main objectives. Howell
seeks to clarify the muddy waters of unilateral authority : the world of executive
orders, national security directives and proclamations. He also develops a formal,
rational choice model of Presidential direct action. Presidential discretion depends
on the ability of Congress, and the inclination of the courts, to challenge the uni-
lateral action. Howell emphasizes that, in the real political world, Congress fre-
quently has neither the time, the information, nor any real incentive to check the
President. Here he challenges not merely the Neustadt thesis, but also familiarly
comforting notions of executive – legislative mutual balancing over time. Howell
nevertheless certainly does see Congress as a key constraint. He notes, for example,
the re-emergence of such constraint after the initial period of unilateral White House
response to 9/11. He also maintains that judges are only rarely inclined to review
instances of unilateral Presidential discretion, and even more rarely inclined to ﬁnd
against Presidents. The 1952 ‘‘Steel Seizure ’’ decision was not typical, and in any
case, according to Howell, is compatible with some very generous interpretations of
the limits of Presidential discretion.
Howell is also concerned with explaining political change – notably with ac-
counting for the vast increase in President direct action since the middle years of
the twentieth century. He suggests that the explanation lies in a combination of
broadened public expectations, Congressional fragmentation, judicial insouciance
2 George Dangerﬁeld, The Strange Death of Liberal England (London: Constable, 1936).
3 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power : the Politics of Leadership (New York : Wiley, 1960).
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and ‘‘ the steady growth of the administrative state ’’ (180). Many of Howell’s points
are very convincing. He is emphatically not arguing that Presidents can do, and get
away with, whatever they want. It is correct to emphasize that unilateral action –
from FDR’s internment of Japanese Americans in World War Two to Bill Clinton’s
use of executive orders partially to circumvent legislative stances on health care
and tobacco control – is of great substantive importance. Direct action enables
Presidents to seize the initiative, exploiting the informational and collective action
problems attaching to Congressional retaliation. Textbooks on the Presidency, which
focus to a large extent on legislation, do not accord enough space to direct action.
However, like Brands, Howell has a tendency to overstatement. Unilateral ac-
tions – especially, but not entirely, executive orders – have not been ignored by
Presidential specialists. As Howell himself shows, direct action has generated its own
literature ; (oddly, Howell does not cite the work of Charles Tiefer on eﬀorts to
bypass Congress under President George H. W. Bush).4 Howell’s eagerness to usurp
Neustadt’s ‘‘power to persuade ’’ model is a little disconcerting. Are reconciliation
and mutual adjustment between the two approaches entirely inconceivable, par-
ticularly given Howell’s repeated assertions that he is still concerned to emphasize
constraints on executive authority? At the very least, much further investigation is
needed into the association – recently commented on by Richard Pious5 – between
Presidential command and the failure to persuade.
The relatively narrow scope of Howell’s empirical survey further calls into ques-
tion his claim to have achieved Neustadtian regicide. Power without Persuasion does not
treat issues of implementation or of Federalism. National security directives, prob-
ably the most potent of all unilateralist tools available to a President, are deemed too
imprecise and shrouded in secrecy to be susceptible to sustained political scientiﬁc
examination. Howell accurately details the legislature’s formidable array of budget-
ary authority, but – strangely, given his focus on Presidential command – mentions
reprogramming of funds by executive ﬁat only very brieﬂy, and President Nixon’s
impoundments of appropriated funds not at all. Expanded treatment of such issues
would have strengthened Howell’s case (although examination of the Nixon im-
poundments, culminating in the 1974 passage of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act, might also have given more weight to a more orthodox
action/reaction model of executive-legislative relations). Nevertheless, as it stands,
Howell’s post-Neustadtian paradigm does rest on quite a narrow base of empirical
data, mainly on executive orders. It must here be admitted that parts of Howell’s
exegesis – development of the formal model, pages of algebra – go beyond the in-
tellectual competence of this reviewer. What may be concluded is that this is a work
of high academic intelligence. It draws attention to a key facet of Presidential
authority, as well as making important empirical discoveries. (Howell ﬁnds, for
example, that executive orders are more likely to be issued under conditions of
uniﬁed rather than divided government.)
4 Charles Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign Presidency : the Bush Administration’s Strategy for Governing
without Congress (Boulder : Westview Press, 1994).
5 Richard Pious, ‘‘Constitutional Perogatives and Presidential Power, ’’ in George C.
Edwards III and Philip Davies, eds., New Challenges for the American Presidency (New York:
Longman, 2004), 211–28.
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Drew Noble Lanier’s Of Time and Judicial Behavior is based on a massive, and largely
original, data set of Supreme Court agenda-setting and individual Justices’ decisions
between 1888 and 1997. Here are buckets and buckets of Russellian shot. The book
will be enormously valuable to historians of the Supreme Court, especially for the
pre-World War Two era, where such organized data have been scarce. Beyond the
diligent accumulation and codiﬁcation of complex data, Lanier’s approach is that of
an institutionally oriented rational choicer : ‘‘political outcomes result from indi-
vidual, goal-oriented behavior that is determined by the limitations and oppor-
tunities that institutions aﬀord the political actors who function within them’’ (177).
The author’s scientistic exposition does not make for lively reading. His expla-
nations for, and discussion of, political change, such as the rise of civil liberties cases,
cry out for the historian’s understanding of social context and ﬂux. Lanier com-
ments : ‘‘ the results suggest that the behavior of the Court is not simply a function of
the members’ unmediated policy views_ ’’ Decisions, rather unsurprisingly, are
‘‘ also dependent on events outside the Court building_ ’’ (207). Not all Lanier’s
conclusions are banal. He demonstrates that ‘‘ exogenous shocks ’’ – like the Panic of
1893 and the Great Depression – reverberate on judges’ decisions for decades. He
ﬁnds the Fuller, White and Taft Court decisions (1888–1930) more liberal, at least on
economic issues, than often presumed. (Interestingly, Lanier takes a more expansive
view of ‘‘ liberalism’’ than does Brands.6)
The author already of a major historical and constitutional study of the Federal
impeachment process, Michael Gerhardt wears his considerable learning very lightly.
His style is lively and often partisan. Though he sees ‘‘historical institutionalism’’ as
a way to avoid the common view that ‘‘ current crises are worse than those experi-
enced at other times, ’’ he is clearly out of sympathy with the appointments strategy
of the George W. Bush Administration. The Federal Appointments Process covers ju-
dicial and executive branch nomination and conﬁrmation, set against the dynamics
of ‘‘historical institutionalist ’’ development. Such development is seen to be aﬀected
by factors such as the changing fortunes of political parties and interest groups, and
media coverage of the process. Gerhardt also has light to shed on William Howell’s
‘‘direct action’’ thesis. Michael Gerhardt shows how Presidents can act as instigative
‘‘norm entrepreneurs, ’’ eﬀecting change in the conventions of the appointments
process. George W. Bush, for example, abandoned the norm of allowing the
American Bar Association to pre-screen judicial nominees. Clinton and G. W. Bush
also used ‘‘ recess ’’ or ‘‘ acting ’’/‘‘ temporary ’’ appointments to subcabinet posts –
evoking memories of Richard Nixon’s ‘‘ imperial Presidency ’’ – in order to evade
Senatorial ‘‘ advice and consent. ’’ Gerhardt’s study, however, is located ﬁrmly within
a Neustadtian ‘‘bargaining ’’ framework. Clinton’s ‘‘ recess ’’ appointments were a
response to the intense hostility of key Republican committee chairmen: essentially,
‘‘bargaining ’’ by other means. In Gerhardt’s world, actions have their reactions, and
Presidents share power with interest groups and with Congress. Some of Clinton’s
non-conﬁrmed ﬁgures, notably his six chief White House counsels, were subjected
to severe – ‘‘ frequently unpleasant ’’ – legislative scrutiny, with a consequently high
casualty rate.
6 Lanier follows a deﬁnition that includes support for ‘‘underdogs ’’ in American society : Of
Time and Judicial Behavior, 131.
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What conclusions should we draw? The best academic work in politics – as dis-
tinct from metaphysics – should avoid both excessive amounts of explanatory jelly
and too many buckets of empirical shot. Writers should avoid pushing arguments
too far. Not every substantial new piece of research should be expected to erect a
new paradigm. The best work indicates the best place for political science and
political history – together.
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